Initial models in conditionals: evidence from priming by Espino, Orlando & Santamaría, Carlos
We examined the comprehension of different types of conditionals. We measured the
reading time of sentences primed by different types of conditionals (Experiments 1 and
2). We found  that the participants read not-p and not-q faster when it was primed by the
conditional form p if q and they were slower to read p and q when it was primed by the
conditional form p only if q. This effect disappeared in the second experiment, where the
order of the elements was reversed (q and p and not-q and not-p). These results suggest
that the conditional form p if q elicits an initial representation “from p to q” with two
possibilities, while the conditional form p only if q elicits a reverse representation with
only one possibility. The third experiment showed that there were effects of the order
only for the conditional if p then q, which confirms the reverse representation hypothesis.
We discuss the implications of these results for different theories of conditional
comprehension.
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Examinamos la comprensión de diferentes tipos de condicionales. Medimos el tiempo
de lectura de frases facilitadas por diferentes tipos de condicionales (experimentos 1 y
2). Encontramos que los participantes leían no-p y no-q más rápidamente cuando era
facilitada por la forma condicional p si q y que eran más lentos leyendo p y q cuando
era facilitada por la forma condicional p sólo si q.  Este efecto desapareció en el segundo
experimento, donde el orden de los elementos se invirtió (q y p y no-q y no-p). Estos
resultados sugieren que la forma del condicional p si q elicita una representación inicial
“desde p a q” con dos posibilidades, mientras que la forma condicional p sólo si q elicita
una representación inversa con una sola posibilidad. El tercer experimento mostró que
había efectos de orden sólo para el condicional si p entonces q, lo cual confirma la
hipótesis de la representación inversa. Se comentan las implicaciones de estos resultados
para las diversas teorías de comprensión condicional. 
Palabras clave: razonamiento condicional, priming, teoría suposicional, modelo mental 
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A conditional is a declarative sentence in which two
propositions are joined by the connective if ... then. For
example, the sentence if p, then q is a conditional, where p
is the antecedent and q is the consequent. As displayed in
Table 1, there are four inferences that can be obtained from
a conditional: Modus Ponens (MP), Affirmation of
Consequent (AC), Denial of Antecedent (DA) and Modus
Tollens (MT). In a conditional sentence, MP and MT are
correct inferences whereas DA and MT are fallacies.
Research on conditional inference has shown that MP is
more frequently accepted as a correct inference than MT,
and a substantial number of reasoners accept the fallacies
DA and CA as correct inferences (see Evans, Newstead, &
Byrne, 1993, for a review). 
For some time, research interest has been focused on
the conditional form if p then q. Recently, however, more
attention is being given to other ways of formulating the
conditional. Research has been conducted on the conditional
form p only if q and p if q. From the logical view, p only
if q can be converted directly into if p then q, whereas p if
q is equivalent to if q then p (Luckhardt & Bechtel, 1994). 
There are several theories of conditional reasoning that
differ in the ways they account for an individual’s
understanding of conditionals and the inferences made from
these. The formal-rule theories (Braine & O’Brien, 1991;
Rips, 1994) postulate that when people read a conditional
sentence they make a syntactic representation by bringing
to light the underlying logical form. Suppositional theory
(Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005; Over
& Evans, 2003) proposes that people interpret everyday
conditionals in naturals languages by means of the Ramsey
test. According to Ramsey (1931), people who are arguing
with a conditional sentence if p then q are “hypothetically
adding p to their stock knowledge and arguing on that basis
about q.” Suppositional theory predicts that when people
read a conditional, such as if p then q, the “use of if causes
rapid and automatic focus on the p-possibilities for all
conditionals” (Evans & Over, 2004, p. 155). Others
possibilities, such as not p-possibility, are irrelevant for the
conditional. From this point of view, the conditional if p
then q will activate the following mental representations:
p and q
p and not-q
but not the following possibilities:
not-p and q
not-p and not-q
From the suppositional theory, we should predict that
people will have equal access to the possibility not-p and
not-q or not-p and q for different form of conditional (such
as p if q, only if p then q, p only if q and if then q). This
theory predicts that the possibility not-p and not-q is no
considered in conditional reasoning.
On the other hand, the model theory (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991) posits that reasoners understand a conditional
sentence by constructing mental models based on keeping
different possibilities in mind. From the model-theory point
of view, there are two main principles for propositional
reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The first principle
states that people keep in mind the true possibilities of the
conditional. For example, for the conditional if p then q
people might construct the following true possibilities:
p q
not-pq
not-pnot-q
The second principle affirms that participants try to
represent initially as few possibilities as they can.
Consequently, the model theory postulates that initial
representations for the conditionals p and q, p only if q, and
p if q are different (these are summarized in Table 2). Other
authors such as Baurrouillet and Lecas (1998) have proposed
different initial representations for these conditionals. 
The mental representations that participants construct for
these kinds of conditionals have been inferred from two
phenomena: the directional effect and the valence effect. The
directional effect shows that the percentage of forward
inferences (MP and NA) or backward inferences (AC and
MT) that participants make depends on the conditional form.
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Table 1
Four Inferences in Conditional Sentence
Modus Ponens (MP) Modus Tollens (MT)
If p, then q If p, then q
P not q
Therefore: q Therefore: not p
Affirmation Consequent (AC) Denial of Antecedent (DA)
If p, then q If p, then q
q not p
Therefore: p Therefore: not q
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In the conditional rule if p then q participants make more
forward (MP and DA) than backward inferences (AC and
MT), whereas for the conditional form p only if q participants
make more backward than forward inferences (Evans, 1977,
1993; Evans & Beck, 1981; Evans et al., 1993). Moreover,
other studies have shown that reasoners take a different
amount of time to endorse backward or forward inferences
for different conditional forms (Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003;
Santamaría & Espino, 2002). Different hypotheses have been
offered to explain this result. Evans suggested the “focus
hypothesis,” which postulates that people “are inclined to
focus attention on the part of the rule—antecedent or
consequent—which is modified by the if and reason from
that component to the other” (Evans, 1993, p. 9). This
hypothesis predicts that for the conditional form if p then q
reasoners should make more forward than backward
inferences because in this conditional form p is modified by
if. However, this hypothesis predicts that for the conditional
form p only if q or p if q that people will make more
backward than forward inferences, because q is modified by
the if. Grosset and Barrouillet (2003) and Barrouillet and
Lecas (1998) have postulated a “hypothetical value” to
explain the directionality effect. This hypothesis is similar
to Evans’s hypothesis; the only difference is that Grosset and
Barrouillet explain the nature of the focus hypothesis by
assuming that reasoners use a mental footnote to indicate
the hypothetical nature of the antecedent. However, they
predict the same pattern of results as Evans’s model.
Johnson-Laird (1995) explains the directionality effect
in the same terms as the figural effect in syllogistic reasoning.
The figural effect suggests that people tend to frame
conclusions in the same order in which the information has
been entered into working memory.  Johnson-Laird postulates:
“there is now known to be a marked ‘figural effect’ in
propositional reasoning-that is, individuals tend to frame
conclusions in the same order as the information in the
entered working memory (p. 131).” He also predicts that
people prefer to reason from p to q for the following
conditional forms: if p then q, p only if q and p if q. However,
this point of view cannot explain why people produce more
backward inferences (from q to p) than forward inferences
(from p to q) with the conditional p only if q.
The valence effect shows that people make more
affirmative inferences (MP and AC) than negative inferences
(DA and MT). Moreover, it takes more time to endorse
negative rather than affirmative inferences (Grosset &
Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espino, 2002). Evans
(1993), Grosset and Barrouillet and Johnson-Laird and Byrne
(1991) have suggested that participants make fewer negative
than affirmative inferences because the negative inferences
require a fleshing-out process, whereas the affirmative
inferences do not require this process. However, whereas
Evans and Grosset and Barrouillet postulate that the
conditional forms if p then q, p only if q and p if q require
a fleshing-out process to make negative inferences, Johnson-
Laird and Byrne consider that this fleshing-out process is
only necessary for the conditional form if p then q and p if
q. The model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) suggests
that the conditional form p only if q would lead people to
include the negative contingency, yielding two explicit
models right from the start:
p              q
no p     no q
. . .
whereas the conditionals if p then q and p if q elicit the
following initial representation:
p              q
. . .
In the conditional p only if q the possibility not-p and
not-q is part of the initial representation, whereas in the
conditionals if p then q and p if q the possibility not-p and
not-q is not represented. In this case, people have to flesh
out the information present in the implicit model (…) to
reach the possibility not-p and not-q. A plausible explanation
for this prediction of the model theory would be that the
construction of an additional model for p only if q would
be predicted from the pragmatic implications of the word
only which directly refers to the exclusion of a possibility.
It could be considered to be general in language (not
Table 2
Initial Models Proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) and Barrouillet and Lecas (1998, 2003) for the Conditional
Connectives if p then q, only if p then q, and p if q
Type of conditional
if p then q p only if q p if q
p q p q p q 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne
… not-p not-q …
…
Hp  → q p  ← Hq p  ← Hq
Barrouillet & Lecas
… … …
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exclusive of conditional statements). For example, if
someone says, “I only have ten euros,” this person is directly
denying the possibility of having more than ten euros,
whereas if this person says, “I have ten euros,” no such
implication is directly present in the statement. In the case
of conditionals, a statement like “I can go to dinner only if
I have more than ten euros” implies a direct rejection of the
possibility of going to dinner with less than ten euros.
A problem with this line of research is that the mental
representation during comprehension is indirectly
apprehended from the inferences that participants produce
or the time they take to make those inferences. Our aim is
to obtain more direct evidence about the mental
representation that participants have in mind while they
understand different kinds of conditionals. In our study we
use a comprehension task to infer what kind of possibilities
people keep in mind when they understand conditional
sentences. We make use of a priming methodology (see
Santamaría & Espino, 2002; Santamaría, Espino, & Byrne,
2005) to find out what kinds of mental representations people
have in mind when they read different conditionals. 
Conditionals as Primes
We gave our participants a scenario and a question to
read of the following sort: 
Pedro was going to a sports-store with his sister. She told
him that in this store, if there are rackets then there are
rucksacks. When they arrived at the store they saw that there
were rackets and rucksacks. Pedro tried on some sport shoes.
Did Pedro try on some sport shoes?
Our interest was in the length of time it takes participants
to understand the conjunction, there were rackets and there
were rucksacks.  The conditional if there are rackets then
there are rucksacks can act as a prime for the conjunction,
so we expect that participants who have understood the
conditional keep in mind the true possibility in which there
are rackets and rucksacks. When they read the conditional,
their understanding should prime the affirmative possibility,
but it should not prime the negative possibility there were
no rackets and there were no rucksacks.  The length of time
it takes to understand an assertion can provide information
on what is kept in mind. Of course, the negative possibility
contains more words and negation may require additional
processing time, and so our key predictions concern the
efficacy of different conditionals as primes for the same
conjunction. Our claim is that different conditionals require
people to keep in mind different possibilities, and we will
test this claim by comparing different conditionals as primes
for different conjunctions. 
This research had third main goals. First (Experiment
1), it aimed to examine whether the conditional p if q primes
the conjunction not p and not q as compared to the
conditionals if p then q, only if p q and p only if q. Some
authors (e.g., Braine, 1978; O’Brien, Dias, & Roazzi, 1998)
have observed that p if q leads to a biconditional-like
response pattern in conditional syllogism tasks. It could be
that people understand this kind of conditional as a
biconditional. In that case, we should expect that this
conditional form will prime people to read the negative
possibility not p and not q more quickly, compared to other
conditionals (if p then q, only if p q and p only if q).
Suppositional theory (Evans & Over, 2004: Evans et al.,
2005; Over & Evans, 2003) predicts that people will have
equal accessibility the possibility not-p and not-q or not-q
and p for different forms of conditional (p if q, only if p
then q, p only if q, if then q) because this possibility is not
considered when people think with conditional. 
The second purpose (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2)
was to examine whether the conditionals if p then q, p if q
and only if p q prime the conjunction p and q compared to
the conditional p only if q. Some authors (Barrouillet &
Lecas, 1998; Evans, 1993; Santamaría & Espino, 2002)
postulate that the conditional p only if q produces a mental
representation from q to p. Other authors (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991) postulate that the mental representation is from
p to q. If the conditional p only if q produces a mental
representation from q to p, we might expect people to read
more slowly the affirmative possibility p and q after this
conditional compared to other conditionals (if p then q, only
if p q and p if q). 
The third purpose (Experiment 3) was to examine a
conjunction (p and q or q and p) as a prime for
understanding the conditional if p then q or the conditional
p only if q. If the conditional if p then q produces a mental
representation from p to q, as some authors postulate
(Barrouillet & Lecas, 1998; Evans, 1993; Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991; Santamaría & Espino, 2002), we might expect
that the affirmative conjunction p and q will prime reading
of the conditional if p then q compared with the affirmative
conjunction q and p.  For these authors, the conditional p
only if q produces a mental representation from q to p. From
this point of view, we might expect that the affirmative
conjunction q and p will prime reading the conditional p
only if q compared with the affirmative conjunction from p
and q.  
In this paper, we make no strong claims about which of
the various versions of the model theory we have illustrated
is correct. The aim of the following studies is simply to test
which is most accurate.
Experiment 1
The aim of this experiment was to examine the
differences in interpretation between different types of
conditional. We made use of a comprehension task in which
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no propositional inference was required. For this purpose,
we composed paragraphs that included four types of
conditional sentence of the types if p then q, p only if q,
only if p q and p if q. After this sentence, the paragraphs
included a conjunction that was either affirmative (p and q)
or negative (not-p and not-q). This conjunction was the test
sentence. 
As mentioned above, several authors have proposed
that people keep in mind different representations when
they read the conditionals if p then q, p if q, and p only
if q (Braine, 1978; Evans, 1993; Evans & Over, 2004:
Evans et al., 2005; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002; Over & Evans, 2003). In this
experiment, we will check these predictions. Evans (1993)
and Grosset and Barrouillet (2003) have proposed that the
conditional if p then q produces a mental representation
from p to q, whereas the conditionals p only if q and p if
q produce a mental representation from q to p. From this
view, it might be expected that the participants will read
p and q faster after reading the conditional form if p then
q than after p if q and p only if q. Moreover, it could be
predicted that there will be no difference between different
conditional forms when participants read the test sentence
not-p and not-q (Evans, 1993; Evans & Over, 2004: Evans
et al., 2005; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Over & Evans,
2003). Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have proposed
that these conditionals (if p then q, p only if q, and p if
q) produce a mental representation from p to q. Thus, it
might be expected that there will be no differences
between different conditional forms when participants read
the test sentence p and q. However, as Johnson-Laird and
Byrne (1991) have proposed that for the conditional p
only if q, there are two models (p and q and not p and
not q), we could expect from this point of view that the
participants will read not-p and not-q faster after reading
the conditional form p only if q than after p if q or if p
then q. Braine’s (1978) theory predicts that the participants
will read not-p and  not-q faster after reading the
conditional form p only if q than after if p then q, as the
interpretation of p only if q would depend on a rephrasing
of the statement as if not q then not p. From this view,
people will read not-p and not-q faster after reading the
conditional form p if q, compared to the conditional if p
then q.
Method
Participants 
The participants were 40 students at the University of
La Laguna, who received course credit for their participation.
Design and Materials
We constructed 48 paragraphs along the lines of the
example in Table 3. The two independent variables: form
of the conditional (if p then q, only if p q, p only if q, and
p if q) and form of the test sentence (p and q, not-p and
not-q), were manipulated within participants. The design
was fully within participants and the 8 experimental
conditions (4 conditionals × 2 conjunctions) were given to
participants for 6 different contents, making a total of 48
trials.  Each individual participant was given the 48 trials
with a different content assigned at random, that is, 48
distinct contents.  There were also 32 filler paragraphs in
which no propositional connectives appeared (which used
32 different contents). We gave each participant the 80 trials
in a different random order. One half of the questions
required an affirmative response and the other half required
a negative response. The questions targeted were presented
at the start, middle, and end of the stories to ensure that
participants read each story. None of the questions entailed
a propositional inference.
Six practice paragraphs were presented before the
experimental set. Four of these paragraphs matched the
structure of the experimental texts and two were similar to
the filler paragraphs.
Table 3
Example Paragraph from Experiment 1
Setting sentences: Pedro was going to a sports-store with his sister.
She told him that in this store,
Critical (if p then q): if there are rackets then there are rucksacks.
Critical (only if p q): only if there are rackets there are rucksacks.
Critical (p only if q): there are rackets only if there are rucksacks.
Critical (p if q): there are rackets if there are rucksacks.
Filler: When they arrived at the store they saw that,
Test sentence p and q: there were rackets and rucksacks.
Test sentence not-p and  not-q: there were no rackets and there were no rucksacks.
Filler: Pedro tried on some sports shoes.
Question: Did Pedro try on some sports shoes?
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Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room
and the experiment was controlled on-line by an IBM
compatible computer. They were encouraged to read the
paragraphs carefully at their own pace, and to answer the
questions as quickly and accurately as possible. The
paragraphs were presented one sentence at a time (as shown
in Table 3). After reading each sentence, the participants
had to press the space bar to erase the screen and display
the next sentence. After reading the question, the participants
responded Yes by pressing the right-hand key or No by
pressing the left-hand key. The purpose of these questions
was to ensure that the participants are reading and
understanding the paragraphs, but they did not entail
propositional inferences, so the percentages of correct
responses were not analyzed. The computer recorded
participants’ reading times for the test sentences.  
Results
Only participants who had more than 90% correct
responses to the simple questions were included in the analysis
and only the reading times corresponding to their correct
responses were analyzed (the same criterion will be used in
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). The reading times for the
test sentence (p and q or not-p and not-q) are presented in
Table 4. The ANOVA with repeated measures showed a
reliable main effect of type of conditional, F(3, 117) = 6.92,
MSE = 21911, p < .001, and test sentence, F(1, 39) = 120.49,
MSE = 34689, p < .0001. Effect for the interaction was not
found, F(3, 117)= 2.15, MSE = 21119, p = .098. 
Planned comparison showed that the participants took more
time to read the p and q sentence after the conditional p only
if q than for other conditional forms (the differences with p if
q was 125 milliseconds; t = 4.32, p < .001; the differences
with only if p q was 78 milliseconds, t = 2.09, p < .05; the
differences with if p then q was 74 milliseconds, t = 2.10, P
< .05. Planned comparison for the affirmative sentence p
and q did not show reliable differences between the other
conditional forms. 
Planned comparison showed that the participants took
less time to read the not-p and not-q sentence after the
conditional p if q than for other conditional forms: The
differences with if p then q was 82 milliseconds, t = 2.45,
p < .025; the differences with only if p q was 110
milliseconds, t = 3.13, p < .005; the differences with p only
if q was 77 milliseconds, t = 2.32, p < .05. Planned
comparison for the negative sentence not-p and not-q did
not show reliable differences between the other conditional
forms. 
Discussion
In this experiment, we found two interesting results:
Firstly, participants took more time to read the test sentence
p and q after the conditional p only if q than after all the
other types of conditional (p if q, only if p q, if p then q);
secondly, participants took less time to read the test sentence
not-p and  not-q after the conditional p if q than after any
other type of conditional (p only if q, only if p q, if p then
q). The first result supports the idea that the conditional
form p only if q is more difficult because the mental
representation is in the reverse direction. It is consistent
with the idea of a directionality effect in conditional
reasoning (Evans, 1993). As we have maintained elsewhere
(Santamaría & Espino, 2002), it could be considered that
the conditional form p only if q elicits the following initial
mental representation:
q     p 
…
This proposal can also explain why, in some experiments
(Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995, Experiment 1; Santamaría
& Espino, 2002, Experiment  2) participants make more AC
inferences with the conditional form p only if q than with
if p then q. Grosset and Barrouillet (2003) have presented
some results that give support to this proposal. These authors
found that the latencies are longer for the backward
affirmative inferences (from q to p) for the conditional if p
then q than for the conditional p only if q. Santamaría and
Espino demonstrated a similar result for latencies in all
backward inferences (from q to p) and they also found that
the response latencies in forward inferences (from p to q)
are shorter for the conditional form if p then q than the
conditional p only if q. 
The second result showed that after reading the
conditional form p if q participants took less time to read
the sentence not-p and  not-q than after the other conditional
forms (if p then q, only if p q, p only if q). This results is
contrary to the suppositional theory because this theory
predicts that there will be no difference between different
conditional forms when participants read the test sentence
not-p and not-q (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans et al., 2005;
Table 4
Reading-Times (in Milliseconds) for the Test Sentence in
Experiment 1 (SD in Brackets)
Test sentence
Affirmative Negative
(p & q) (¬p & ¬q)
If p then q 1318 (234) 1566 (307)
only if p q 1313 (188) 1594 (306)
p only if q 1392 (304) 1561 (314)
p if q 1267 (252) 1483 (252)
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Over & Evans, 2003). On the other hand, this result suggests
that the conditional form p if q elicits the following two
explicit models:
p          q 
no p     no q
…
This proposal can explain why, in some experiments
(Braine & O’Brien, 1998, Table 14.4; Evans et al., 1995,
Experiment  1; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003), participants made
more MT and DA inferences with the conditional form p if q
than with the conditional form if p then q. Moreover, it can
explain why participants make more DA inferences with the
conditional form p if q than with the conditional form p only
if q (see Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003). Grosset and Barrouillet
found that the mean reaction time to endorse the backward
negative inferences (from not-q to not-p) was higher in the
conditional if p then q than for the conditional p if q. Moreover,
these authors showed that the mean reaction time to endorse
the forward negative inferences (from not-p to not-q) was
higher in the conditional p only if q than in the conditional p
if q. Therefore, the results of our Experiment 1, taken together
with previous research (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Evans et al.,
1995; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espino,
2002) sustain the proposal that p if q elicits an initial model
with two possibilities: p and q and not-p and not-q. 
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that for the conditional
form p only if q, people build a mental representation in which
the elements are in the reverse order. The aim of Experiment
2 was to test this hypothesis by presenting the elements of
the test sentence in reverse order (q and p and not-q and not-
p). We predicted that the reverse presentation would delay
the reading of the test sentence when the mental representation
was in the order p q as in the conditional if p then q. However,
this delay would not occur in p only if q if it were the case
that in this conditional form the mental representation is in
the reverse order. In this case, the natural delay of a reverse
presentation of the elements in the test sentence will be
compensated by the coincidence with the mental
representation.  Consequently, the difference found in
Experiment 1 between p only if q and the other conditional
forms in the affirmative test sentences will disappear.
Method
Participants 
The participants were 40 students at the University of
La Laguna, who received course credit for their participation.
Design, Materials and Procedure
The design and materials were similar to those used
in Experiment 1. The only difference was that the order
of p and q in the test sentence were reversed in this
experiment. Consequently, we used two different kinds of
test sentences in this experiment: q and p and not-q and
not-p; and four conditional forms: if p then q, only if p
q, p if q and p only if q. The procedure was the same as
that of Experiment 1.
Results
The reading times for the test sentence (q and p or not-
q and not-p) are presented in Table 5. As in Experiment 1,
only the RTs for correct responses were considered. The
ANOVA with repeated measures for the factor type of
conditional (if p then q, only if p q, p only if q and p if q)
and the factor test sentence (q and p versus not-q and not-
p) showed a main effect for the test sentence, F(1, 39) =
182.58 MSE = 28293, p < .001. This main effect
demonstrated that the affirmative test sentence was read
more quickly than the negative test sentence. No effect for
the interaction, F(3, 117) = 2.07, MSE = 38305, p = .10, or
for the type of conditional, F(3, 117) = 2.40, MSE = 24352,
p = 0.07, was found. Planned comparison for the affirmative
test sentence q and p did not show reliable differences
between conditional forms. 
A planned comparison showed that the participants took
less time to read the test sentence not-q and not-p after
the conditional p if q than for the conditional if p then q
(107 milliseconds), t = 2.64, p < .025, and the conditional
form p only if q (104 milliseconds), t = 2.86, p < .01.
Although the participants took less time to read the test
sentence not-q and not-p after reading the conditional p if
q than the conditional only if p q the difference was not
reliable (57 milliseconds), t = 1.60, p = .12. Planned
comparisons for the sentences q and p and not-p and not-
q did not show reliable differences between the other
conditional forms. 
Table 5
Reading-Times (in Milliseconds) for the Test Sentence in
Experiment 2 (SD in Brackets)
Test sentence
Affirmative Negative
(q & p) (¬q & ¬p)
If p then q 1292 (329) 1592 (358)
only if p q 1257 (279) 1542 (328)
p only if q 1319 (308) 1589 (385)
p if q 1324 (285) 1485 (334)
Discussion
Two main results were found in the second experiment.
The first result showed that when the test sentence is in
the reverse order (q and p), then the difference between
the conditional form p only if q and the other conditional
forms (if p then q, only if p q, p if q) disappears. The
second result showed that the participants read the test
sentence not q and not p after reading the conditional form
p if q faster than when they read other types of conditionals
(if p then q, only if p q, p if q). The first result suggests
that when the participants read a conditional form p only
if q they built a mental representation in which the elements
of the conditional are in the reverse order (q and p). The
results of the first experiment also supported this idea. In
the first experiment, the participants always took more
time to read the test sentence p and q after reading the
conditional form p only if q than for other conditional
forms (if p then q, only if p q, p if q). But in the second
experiment, when they had to read the test sentence in
reverse order (q and p) the difference disappears. As
previously mentioned, we did not predict that people would
take less time to read the reverse order q and p after
reading the conditional p only if q than other conditional
forms because for the conditional p only if q, there are two
opposite directionality effects: one of these effects (the
text effect for the conditional) is going in the direction
from p to q and the other effect (mental representation) is
going in the direction from q to p. Because these effects
are in competition with each other, we did not predict any
directional effect.
The second result shows that the participants read the
test sentence not-q and not-p faster after reading the
conditional form p if q than when they read other types of
conditionals (if p then q, only if p q, p only if q). This result
supports the idea that the participants built the following
two models for p if q:
p          q 
no p     no q
…
Although the elements of the test sentence were in the
reverse order (not-q and not-p), the participants read this
sentence more quickly after reading the conditional form p
if q than for other conditional forms (if p then q, only if p
q, p only if q). The reason they read not-q and not-p faster
could be that they built the representation for the negative
test sentence (not p and not p). 
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that for conditionals of the
form p only if q the affirmative q and p possibility is kept
in mind, whereas for the form if p then q, the affirmative p
and q possibility is kept in mind. In this next experiment,
our interest was in the length of time it takes participants
to understand the conditional form if p then q or p only if
q, when primed by the conjunctions: p and q and q and p.
The logic of this procedure is that if people has in mind
one possibility that is true, it will be easier to process a
propositional sentence  in which the possibility is true  than
a propositional sentence in which the possibility is false.
We predict an effect of directionality for the conditional
form if p then q: People will take less time to read the
conditional form if p then q after they have read p and q
compared to q and p. However, we do not predict any affect
of directionality for the conditional p only if q: People will
take a similar time to read the conditional form p only if q
after they have read p and q, compared to q and p. As
previously mentioned, we predict that the directionality effect
will be cancelled in the conditional form p only if q because
there are opposite directionality effects. 
Method
Participants 
The participants were a different set of 40 students at
the University of La Laguna, who received course credit
for their participation.
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Table 6
Example Paragraph from Experiment 3
Setting sentences: Pedro was going to a sports-store with his sister.
She told him that in this store,
Critical (p and q): there are rackets and there are rucksacks. 
Critical (q and p): there are rucksacks and there are rackets.
Filler: When they arrived at the store they saw that,
Test sentence if p then q: if there are rackets then there are rucksacks.
Test sentence p only if q: there are rackets only if there are rucksacks.
Filler: Pedro tried on some sports shoes.
Question: Did Pedro try on some sports shoes?
Design, Materials and Procedure
Design was within subject (2 conditionals × 2 conjunctions).
Materials and procedure were all similar to that used in previous
experiments. The only difference was that in this experiment
the participants read first the conjunction premise (p and q and
q and p) and later they read the principal premise (if p then q
or p only if q). In this experiment the dependent variable was
the reading time for the conditional form if p the q or p only
if q. Table 6 shows an example.
Results
The reading times for the test sentence (if p then q or p
only if q) are presented in Table 7. Only the RTs for correct
responses were considered. The ANOVA with repeated
measures for the factor type of conditional (if p then q and
p only if q) and order of the terms of the conjunction (q and
p versus not-q and not-p) showed a main effect for the type
of conditional, F(1, 39) = 12.09, MSE = 41320,  p < .001).
This main effect demonstrated that the conditional if p then
q was read more quickly than the conditional p only if q.
Also, there was an effect for the interaction, F(1, 39) = 4.58,
MSE = 31386, p < .05). This interaction showed that the
participants took less time (M = 1669 milliseconds) to read
the conditional if p then q after the conjunction p and q than
the conjunction q and p (M = 1780 milliseconds), t = 2.49,
p < .02. However, they take a similar amount of time (M =
1840 milliseconds) to read the conditional p only if q after
the conjunction p and q than the conjunction q and p (M =
1832 milliseconds), t = 0.16, p = .86.  No effect of the order
of the terms of the conjunction was found, F(3,) = 1.77,
MSE = 59725, p = .19.
Discussion
The main result in Experiment 3 was the interaction
found between order (p and q versus q and p) and type of
conditional (if p then q versus p only if q). As we predicted,
there was only an effect of directionality in the conditional
form if p then q, but not in the conditional form p only if
q. This result is consistent with previous research (Santamaría
& Espino, 2002) and gives support to the idea that for the
conditional form p only if q people built a mental
representation in which the elements of the conditional are
in the reverse order (q and p). Moreover, the results of
Experiments 1 and 2 also support this idea. In Experiment
1, participants always took more time to read the test
sentence p and q after reading the conditional form p only
if q than other conditional forms (if p then q, only if p q, p
if q). Experiment 2 showed that when participants had to
read the test sentence in the reverse order (q and p), the
difference between the conditional forms (if p then q, only
if p q, p if q) disappears. 
General Discussion
The three experiments reported here rely on a new
priming methodology that directly tests predictions about
the way people understand different forms of conditionals
(if p then q, p if q, only if p q, p only if q). Our first
experiment corroborated the suggestion that a conditional
form p if q is understood by keeping in mind the affirmative
possibility p and q and the negative possibility not-p and
not-q. Participants read the conjunction not-p and not-q
more quickly after they were primed with the conditional
form p if q, compared to when they were primed with other
conditional forms (such as if p then q, only if p q, and p
only if q). 
The first experiment suggested that a conditional form
p only if q is understood by keeping in mind the reverse
affirmative possibility q and p. Participants read a
conjunction such as p and q more slowly after they were
primed with a conditional form p only if q, compared to
when they were primed with other conditional forms (if p
then q, p if q, only if p q). This suggestion gained additional
support in Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2, when the
order of the elements in the conjunction was reversed
(participants read q and p and not-q and not-p), the
participants took a similar time to read the conjunction q
and p primed by a conditional form p only if q, or other
conditional forms (if p then q, only if p q and p only if q).
In other words, when the order of the elements in the
conjunction is reversed, the effect of the first experiment
disappears. In Experiment 3, participants first read the
conjunction in a different order (p and q versus q and p)
and later they read the conditional form (if p then q versus
p only if q). In this experiment, we found an interaction
between the order of terms in the conjunction (p and q
versus q and p) and the form of the conditional (if p then
q versus p only if q): People took less time to read the
conditional form if p then q after they read the conjunction
p and q than the conjunction q and p, but they took a similar
amount of time to read the conditional form p only if q after
reading the conjunction p and q than the conjunction q and
p. Thus, there was a directionality effect only for the
conditional form if p then q. 
ESPINO AND SANTAMARÍA44
Table 7
Reading-Times (in Milliseconds) for the Test Sentence in
Experiment 3 (SD in Brackets)
Test sentence
if p then q p only if q
p and q 1669 (408) 1840 (567)
q and p   1780 (419) 1832 (445)
We did not predict any directionality effect in Experiment
2 nor in Experiment 3 for the conditional form p only if q
because for this conditional there are opposite directionality
factors: Firstly, the conditional form p only if q was presented
in the text in the direction from p to q. Secondly, we
predicted that the mental representation for the conditional
form p only if q would produce a mental model in the
direction from q to p (Evans, 1993; Grossett & Barrouillet,
2003; Santamaría & Espino, 2002). 
The results of priming experiments such as ours have
implications for different theories of conditionals (Braine,
1978; Evans, 1993; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991). Although these results can be
explained by the standard model theory (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991, 2002), some changes are necessary. As we
mentioned, the model theory suggests that the conditional
form p only if q would lead people to include the negative
contingency, yielding two explicit models right from the
start:
p              q
no p     no q
. . .
So that it should be predicted that the participants would
read the negative test sentence not-p and not-q more quickly
after p only if q than after the conditional form if p then q.
However, this proposal fails to explain the results of our
Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  From our point of view, the model
theory can explain these results by assuming that the initial
representation of the conditional form p only if q includes
a single explicit model in the reverse direction:
q    p
…
This kind of initial representation is consistent with our
results and also with previous research (Evans et al., 1995,
Experiment 1; Santamaría & Espino, 2002, Experiment  2). 
A further result that is difficult to explain from the model
theory is why participants read the negative test sentences
not-p and not-q (Experiment 1) and not-q and not-p
(Experiment 2) more quickly after reading the conditional
form p if q than other conditional forms (if p then q, ‘p only
if’, only if p q). The model theory suggests that the
conditional form p if q would lead people to include a single
explicit model: 
p              q
. . .
and predicts that participants will read the negative test
sentence not-p and  not-q more slowly after reading this
conditional than, for example,  the conditional form p only
if q. This proposal fails to explain our results in Experiments
1 and 2. However, these results could be explained by
assuming that the initial representation of the conditional
form p if q includes the following two explicit models:
p              q
no p     no q
. . .
Our proposal is, then, in agreement with results both
from our experiments here and with previous research
(Braine & O’Brian, 1998, Table 14.4; Evans et al., 1995,
Experiment 1; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003).
The results from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 do not,
however, support either Grosset and Barrouillet’s (2003) or
Evans’ (1993) findings. Grosset and Barrouillet posited that
the conditional form p if q elicits a single explicit model
from q to p. However, the results from our Experiments 1
and 2 are consistent with the proposal that for the conditional
form p if q, people build two explicit models from p to q.
Evans suggested that there is a preference to reason from
the clause following if.  This hypothesis could explain our
data for the conditional form p only if q but cannot explain
the data for the conditional form p if q.
Also, these data may be particularly difficult for a theory,
which predicts that people understand ordinary conditionals
of the natural language by means of the Ramsey test (Evans
& Over, 2004: Evans et al., 2005; Over & Evans, 2003).
This test implies that people understand the ordinary
conditional as conditional probabilities. In this case people
needs only consider the ratio of cases in which the
antecedent and consequent of conditional is true (TT) and
the ratio in which the antecedent of conditional is true and
the antecedent is false (TF).  By applying the Ramsey test
to the conditionals, the suppositional theory predicts that
people should take similar time to read the false possibility
(FF) after reading a conditionals (if p then q, p only if q, p
if q, only if p then q). Our results (Experiment 1 and 2)
showed that people took less time to read the possibility
not-p and not q or not-q and not-p in the conditional p if q
but not in others conditionals (if p then q, p only if q, only
if p then q).
The mental logic theory (Braine, 1978) cannot explain
our results. Braine proposed that the meaning of p only if
q would be equivalent to if not q then not p. However,
Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find that participants read
not-p and  not-q faster after reading the conditional p only
if q than, for example, after the conditional if p then q as
would be expected from this point of view. 
Although our results are consistent with the general
model theory framework, they are somewhat puzzling, and
further work is needed to develop a more complete
theoretical understanding of them. For example, the mental
model theory should explain why there is a directional effect
(forward or backward effect) for conditionals and why some
conditional forms yield two initial models (for example, p
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if q). Our results seem to support the idea that the conditional
p if q yields the initial construction of two models in forward
direction and that the conditional of the form p only if q is
represented by oriented models from q to p. We suggest that
there are two factors that could operate simultaneously in
a forward or backward direction. The first of them is the
order of the propositions in the sentence. As proposed in
the field of text comprehension (see, Gernsbacher, 1990),
people tend to use the first proposition in the sentence (p
or q) as the foundation of the mental model, and the second
proposition is appended to this model (see, Espino,
Santamaría, & García-Madruga, 2000, for a demonstration
of this effect in reasoning). According to this factor, in the
conditionals p only if q and p if q, there is a directional
effect from p to q due to the “first mention” effect
(Gernsbacher, 1990). The second factor relies on the
connective used. We suggest that every connective has an
inherent semantic directionality (Evans, 1993; Grosset &
Barrouillet, 2003; Oberauer & Wilhem, 2000). We suggest,
as Evans and Grosset and Barrouillet, that the connectives
if and only if have a directional bias from q to p (backward
effect). Also, we suggest that in the conditional p if q the
directional effect due to the order of the propositions in the
sentence is stronger than the directional effect due to the
inherent semantic directionality. For this reason there is a
directional effect from p to q in the conditional p if q.
However, we suggest that in the conditional p only if q, the
directional effect due to the order of the term in the sentence
is weaker that the directional effect due to the inherent
semantic directionality because as we have noted, the
addition of the word only stresses the next proposition in
language. For this reason, there is a directional effect from
q to p in this conditional. Moreover, we suggest that the
conditional p if q yields two models because the first term
p is not taken as a hypothetical value (as no conditional
particle appears before, it might be considered categorical)
whereas q is the hypothetical value. Consequently, p becomes
necessary and its presence is matched with q, whereas its
absence (not-p) is matched with not-q. Also, our results
support Grosset and Barrouillet’s (2003) hypothesis for the
conditional p only if q. They suggested that variable q
introduced by the word if provides hypothetical values linked
to outcomes pertaining to the variable p. Consequently, we
suggest that different conditional forms could yield different
initial models. 
In summary, we have used a priming methodology to
obtain a more direct measure of the initial representations
that people construct in order to understand different forms
of conditionals. Until now, evidence about the initial
representation in understanding a conditional has been
indirectly inferred from the conclusions reasoners reach from
these different conditionals. Our results are not only
consistent with those obtained with reasoning tasks; they
also have important implications for conditional reasoning
theories. 
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